

## Using Student Test Scores to Measure Principal Performance

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*Expansion of the use of student test score data to measure teacher performance has fueled recent policy interest in using those data to measure the effects of school administrators as well. However, little research has considered the capacity of student performance data to uncover principal effects. Filling this gap, this article identifies multiple conceptual approaches for capturing the contributions of principals to student test score growth, develops empirical models to reflect these approaches, examines the properties of these models, and compares the results of the models empirically using data from a large urban school district. The article then assesses the degree to which the estimates from each model are consistent with measures of principal performance that come from sources other than student test scores, such as school district evaluations. The results show that choice of model is substantively important for assessment. While some models identify principal effects as large as 0.18 standard deviations in math and 0.12 in reading, others find effects as low as 0.05 (math) or 0.03 (reading) for the same principals. We also find that the most conceptually unappealing models, which over-attribute school effects to principals, align more closely with nontest measures than do approaches that more convincingly separate the effect of the principal from the effects of other school inputs.*

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RECENTLY, policymakers have shown increased interest in evaluating school administrators based in part on student test score performance in their schools. For example, in 2011 Florida enacted Senate Bill 736, also known as the “Student Success Act,” which stipulates that at least 50% of every school administrator’s evaluation must be based on student achievement growth as measured by state assessments (Florida Senate, 2011). The bill also orders districts to factor these evaluations into compensation decisions for principals. A year earlier, in Louisiana, Governor Bobby Jindal signed House Bill 1033, which

similarly required school districts to base a portion of principals’ evaluations on student growth by the 2012–2013 school year (Louisiana State Legislature, 2010). Florida and Louisiana’s enactments follow Tennessee’s statewide principal evaluation policy, which requires that “[f]ifty percent of the evaluation criteria shall be comprised of student achievement data, including thirty-five percent based on student growth data . . .”; these evaluations are used to “inform human capital decisions, including . . . hiring, assignment and promotion, tenure and dismissal, and compensation” (Tennessee State Board of

Education, 2011, p. 1). Elsewhere, spurred in many cases by Teacher Incentive Fund grants, school districts nationwide are experimenting with the use of student test scores to determine administrator pay, with student test score growth factoring into bonuses or other compensation in Chicago, Dallas, and Denver, among others (Schuermann, Guthrie, Prince, & Witham, 2009).

A potentially disconcerting facet of the burgeoning movement to utilize student test score data to measure the performance of school administrators is that it is proceeding with little guidance on how this measurement might best be accomplished. That is, while researchers have devoted significant energy to investigating the use of student test scores to evaluate *teacher* performance (e.g., Aaronson, Barrow, & Sander, 2007; Koretz, 2002; McCaffrey, Lockwood, Koretz, Louis, & Hamilton, 2004; McCaffrey, Sass, & Lockwood, 2009; Rivkin, Hanushek, & Kain, 2005; Rockoff, 2004; Sanders & Rivers, 1996), far less work has considered this usage in the context of principals (Branch, Hanushek, & Rivkin, 2012; Chiang, Lipscomb, & Gill, 2012; Coelli & Green, 2012; Dhuey & Smith, 2012; Lipscomb et al., 2010). This article is one of the first to examine measures of principal effectiveness based on student test scores both conceptually and empirically and the first that we know of to see how these measures compare with alternative (non-test-based) evaluation metrics, such as district holistic evaluations.

Although research on the measurement of teacher value-added certainly is relevant to the measurement of principal effects, the latter raises a number of issues that are unique to the principal context. For example, disentangling the impact of the educator from the long-run impact of the school presents particular difficulties for principals because there is only one principal at a time in each school. Moreover, it is difficult to choose how much of the school's performance should be attributed to the principal instead of the factors outside of the principal's control. Should, for example, principals be responsible for the effectiveness of teachers that they did not hire? From the point of view of the school administrator whose compensation level or likelihood of keeping his or her job may depend on the measurement model chosen, thoughtful attention to these details is of paramount importance. For

researchers seeking to identify correlates of principal effectiveness, the question of how best to isolate principal contributions to the school environment from panel data is of central importance as well.

In contributing to the nascent literature on the use of student test score data to measure principal performance, this article has four goals. First, it identifies a range of possible value-added-style models for capturing principal effects using student achievement data. Second, it describes what each of these models measures conceptually, highlighting potential strengths, weaknesses, and trade-offs. Third, it uses longitudinal student test score and personnel data from a large urban district to compare the estimates of principal performance generated by each model, both to establish how well they correlate with one another and to assess the degree to which model specification would lead to different conclusions about the relative performance of principals within each district. Finally, the article compares the results from the different models of principal value-added effectiveness to subjective personnel evaluations conducted by the district central office and survey assessments of principal performance from their assistant principals and teachers. This approach is in keeping with recent work assessing the relationship between teachers' value-added measures of effectiveness and other assessments such as principal evaluations, structured observational protocols, and student surveys (e.g., Grossman, Loeb, Cohen, & Wyckoff, 2013; Jacob & Lefgren, 2008; Kane & Staiger, 2012).

The study identifies three key issues in using test scores to measure principal effectiveness: theoretical ambiguity, potential bias, and reliability. By *theoretical ambiguity*, we mean lack of clarity about what construct is actually being captured. By *potential bias*, we mean that some methods may misattribute other factors (positively or negatively) to principal performance. By *reliability*, or lack thereof, we mean that some approaches create noisy measures of performance, an issue that stands out as particularly salient for district-level evaluation where the number of schools is relatively small.

The remainder of the article proceeds as follows. The next section reviews the existing literature on the measurement of educator effects on

students, detailing prior research for principals and highlighting issues from research on teachers that are relevant to the measurement of principal performance. The “Modeling Principal Effects” section describes possible models for identifying principal performance from student test score data, which is followed by a description of the data used for the empirical section of the article. We then present results from estimating and comparing the models with one another and with other, nontest measures. The last section discusses the implications of this study and offers directions for future research.

### **Using Student Test Scores to Measure Educator Performance**

A large number of studies in educational administration have used student test score data to examine the impact of school leadership on schools (for reviews, see Hallinger & Heck, 1998; Witziers, Bosker, & Krüger, 2003). Often, however, these studies have relied on cross-sectional data or school-level average scores, which have prevented researchers from estimating leadership effects on student growth (rather than levels) or controlling appropriately for student background and other covariates, though there are exceptions. For example, Eberts and Stone (1988) draw on national data on elementary school students to estimate positive impacts of principals’ instructional leadership behaviors on student test scores. Brewer (1993) similarly uses the nationally representative, longitudinal High School and Beyond data to model student achievement as a function of principal characteristics, finding some evidence that principals’ goal setting and teacher selection were associated with student performance gains. In more recent work, Clark, Martorell, and Rockoff (2009), using data from New York City, estimate the relationship between principal characteristics and principal effectiveness as measured by student test score gains. The study finds principals improve with experience, especially during their first few years on the job. Grissom and Loeb (2011) link principal skills, as assessed by principals’ and assistant principals’ assessments of the principals’ strengths, to student achievement growth. They find that principals with stronger organization management skills (e.g., personnel,

budgeting) lead schools with greater student achievement gains. Similarly, Grissom, Loeb, and Master (2013), using data from longitudinal observations of principals, show that principal time spent on specific areas of instructional leadership—including coaching and evaluation—is associated with higher math achievement gains.

Although these past studies have demonstrated linkages between principal behaviors or characteristics and student performance, only four studies that we know of—all but one of which are work in progress—use student achievement data to model principal value-added directly. Coelli and Green (2012), the only published article in this group, estimates the effects of high school principals on graduation and 12th-grade final exam scores in British Columbia. A benefit of this study is that it examines an education system that rotates principals through schools, allowing them to compare outcomes for the same school with different principals, though they cannot follow students over time and are limited to high school outcomes. The authors distinguish a model of principal effects on students that are constant over the period that the principal is in the school from one that allows for a cumulative effect of the principal that builds over time. They find little to no effect of principals using the first model but a substantial effect after multiple years using the second approach (e.g., a 2.6 percentage point increase in graduation associated with a one standard deviation change in principal effectiveness).

Branch et al. (2012) use student-level data from Texas from 1995 to 2001 to create two alternative measures of principal effectiveness. The first measure estimates principal-by-school effects via a regression that models student achievement as a function of prior achievement as well as student and school characteristics. Their second approach, similar to Coelli and Green (2012) but using longitudinal test score data, includes principal fixed effects, school fixed effects, and other student and school level. The article focuses on the variance of principal effectiveness using these measures and a direct measure of variance gained by comparing year-to-year covariance in years that schools switched principals and years that they did not. The article provides evidence of meaningful variation across principals—by their most conservative estimates,

a school with a principal whose effectiveness is one standard deviation above the mean will have student learning gains at 0.05 standard deviations greater than average—but does not directly compare relationships among measures.

Dhuy and Smith (2012) use data on elementary and middle school students, again in British Columbia, and estimate the effect of the principal on test performance using a school and principal fixed effect model that compares the learning in a school under one principal to that under another principal, similar to Branch et al.'s (2012) school fixed effect approach. They also include a specification check without school fixed effects. The study finds large variation across principals using either approach (0.16 standard deviations of student achievement score in math and 0.10 in reading for the fixed effects model).

Finally, Chiang et al. (2012) use data on elementary and middle school students in Pennsylvania to explore how much of the “school effect” on student performance can be attributed to the principal. They estimate principal effects within grades and schools for schools that undergo leadership transitions over a 3-year period, then use those effects to predict school effectiveness in a fourth year in a different grade. They find that while principals do impact student outcomes, principals only explain a small portion (approximately 15%) of the overall school effect and conclude that school value-added on its own is not useful for evaluating the contributions of principals.

Each of these articles quantifies variance in principals' effects and underscores the importance of separating school effects from principal effects. However, none focus on the ambiguity of what aspects of schools should be separated from principals, nor do they discuss how to account for average differences across schools in principal effectiveness. Moreover, none of these studies compare the principal value-added measure with nontest measures.

#### *Is Principal Value-Added Like Teacher Value-Added?*

Unlike the sparse literature linking principals to student achievement, the parallel research on teachers is rich and rapidly developing. This research has documented not only important

variation across teachers in value-added scores estimated from student test scores (e.g., Rivkin et al., 2005; Sanders & Rivers, 1996)—variation that appears to long-run consequences for students (Chetty et al., 2011)—but also a number of concerns with these measures. For example, the signal-to-noise ratio of single-year measures of teachers' contributions to student learning is often low, though the persistent component still appears to be practically meaningful (McCaffrey et al., 2004; McCaffrey et al., 2009). One of the biggest concerns with teacher value-added measures comes from the importance of the test used in the measure. Different tests give different rank orderings for teachers (Lockwood et al., 2007). Researchers have also raised concern about bias in the estimates of teachers value-added (Rothstein, 2009).

Measuring principal performance using student test scores no doubt faces many of the same difficulties as measuring teacher performance using student test scores. The test metric itself is likely to matter (Measures of Effective Teaching Project, 2010). Measurement error in the test, compounded by using changes over time, will bring error into the value-added measure (Boyd, Lankford, Loeb, & Wyckoff, 2013). The systematic sorting of students across schools and classrooms can introduce bias if not properly accounted for.

At first blush, then, we may be tempted to conclude that the measurement issues surrounding principals are similar to those for teachers, perhaps that the much larger number of students available to estimate principal effects will increase precision. Closer examination, however, suggests that measuring principal effects introduces a set of concerns teacher estimates may not face to the same extent. As an example, consider the criticism leveled at teacher effects measurement that teachers often do not have control over the educational environment in their classrooms and thus should not be held accountable for their students' learning. For instance, if they are required to follow a scripted curriculum, then they may not be able to distinguish themselves as effective instructors. This sort of concern is even greater for principals, who, by virtue of being a step removed from the classroom, have even less direct control over the learning environment and who often come into a

school that already has a complete (or near complete) teaching workforce that they did not help choose.

Moreover, in comparison with teachers, the number of principals in any school district is quite small. These low numbers mean that a good comparison between principals working in similar situations—which we often make via a school fixed effect in teacher value-added models—may be difficult to find, and thus, it is more difficult to create fair measures of effectiveness. A final potentially important conceptual issue arises from the fact that—unlike the typical teacher—principals who work in the same school over time will have repeated effects on the same students over multiple academic years as those students move through different grades in the principal's school. The following section explores these issues in more detail and their implications for measuring principals' value-added to student achievement.

### Modeling Principal Effects

The question of how to model principal effects on student learning depends crucially on the structure of the relationship between a principal's performance and student performance. To make this discussion explicit, consider the following equation:

$$A_{ijs} = f\left(X_{ijs}, S(P_{js}, O_s)\right).$$

This equation describes a student  $i$ 's achievement as some function  $f$  of their own characteristics and what they bring with them to school,  $X$ , and the effectiveness of the school,  $S$ . School effectiveness, in turn, is a function of the performance,  $P$ , of the student's principal ( $j$ ) and other aspects of the school ( $s$ ) that are outside of the control of the principal, which we label  $O$ . In other words, the equation simply says that both the level of a principal's performance and other aspects of the school affect student outcomes. The important question is what we believe about the properties of function  $S$ , which describes how the principal affects the school's performance.

Two issues are particularly germane. The first is the time frame over which we expect the effects to be realized. Are the full effects of principal performance on school effectiveness, and thus student outcomes, immediate? That is, is the

function  $S$  such that high performance  $P$  by the principal in a given school year is reflected in higher school effectiveness and higher student outcomes in that same year? Alternatively, is  $S$  cumulative, such that only with several consecutive years of high  $P$  will  $A$  increase? To illustrate the difference and why it is important, consider a principal who is hired to lead a low-performing school. Suppose the principal does an excellent job from the very beginning (i.e.,  $P$  is high). How quickly would you expect that excellent performance to be reflected in student outcomes? The answer depends on the nature of principal effects. If effects come through channels such as assigning teachers to classrooms where they can be more effective or providing teachers or students incentives or other encouragement to exert more effort, they might be reflected in student performance immediately. If, on the contrary, effects come through changes to the school environment that take longer to show results—such as doing a better job recruiting or hiring good teachers—even excellent principal performance may take multiple years to be reflected in student outcomes.

The second issue is separating the principal effect from other characteristics of the school outside of the principal influence; that is, distinguishing  $P$  from  $O$ . One possibility is that  $O$  is not very important for student achievement. That is, the vast majority of school effects—perhaps excluding peer effects, which could be captured by observable characteristics of students (e.g., student poverty)—could be attributable to the principal's performance. In this case, identifying the overall school effect is sufficient for identifying the principal performance effect. It could be, however, that these other school characteristics,  $O$ , that are outside of the principal's control, are important for school effectiveness. For example, some schools may be in locations that make attracting good teachers difficult, or may benefit from unusually supportive community organizations that work to help the school irrespective of the principal's efforts.

With this simple conceptual model in mind, we describe three alternative approaches to using data on  $A$  to differentiate performance  $P$ . The appropriateness of each approach again depends on the underlying nature of principals' effects, which are unknown.



### *Approach 1: School Effectiveness*

Assume first that principals' effects on student achievement are immediate and that principals exercise control over the factors that affect student learning. If these assumptions hold, an appropriate approach to measuring the contribution of that principal would be to measure the learning of students in the school while the principal works there, adjusting for student background characteristics. This straightforward approach is essentially the same as the one used to measure teacher effects: We assume that teachers have immediate effects on students during the year that they are in the teacher's classroom, so we take students' achievement during that year—adjusted for a variety of controls, including lagged achievement and perhaps student fixed effects—as a measure of the teacher's effect. For principals, any growth in student learning that is different than what would be predicted for a similar student in a similar context is attributed to the principal, just as the same growth within a teacher's classroom is attributed to the teacher.

For teachers, such an approach has face validity. Teachers have direct and individual influences on the students in their classrooms, so—assuming the inclusion of the appropriate set of covariates—it makes sense to take the adjusted average learning gains of a teacher's students during a year as a measure of the teacher's effect. The face validity of this kind of approach for principals, however, is not as strong. A portion of a school's effectiveness likely *is* due to the current principal, but much of it may be due to factors that were in place prior to the principal assuming the leadership role that fall largely outside the principal's control. As an example, often many of the teachers who teach under the leadership of a given principal were hired before the principal took over. Particularly in the short run, it would not make sense to attribute all of the contributions of those teachers to that principal. Under this conceptual approach, an excellent new principal who inherits a school filled with ineffective teachers—or, conversely, an inadequate principal hired into a school with outstanding teachers—might incorrectly be debited or credited with school results that are disconnected from his or her own job performance.

A question this last example raises is why we cannot simply separate the effects of principals from their teachers and conceptualize principal effectiveness as what is left after the teacher effectiveness is taken into account. Such an approach, however, is, on closer inspection, unappealing. Principals' effects on students are at least in part—and potentially to a very large extent—mediated by teachers because principals affect student achievement via their effects on teachers' instructional capacity. Principals affect this capacity by which teachers they hire and retain, how they assign teachers to classrooms, the feedback and other opportunities for development they provide to teachers, the resources they supply to teachers, and the protection they give teachers from distractions, among other mechanisms. As a result, taking teacher effects into account in a principal value-added model would remove an important component of the variation in principal effectiveness implicit in the teacher effect estimates.<sup>1</sup>

### *Approach 2: Relative Within-School Effectiveness*

As described above, there may be school factors that are outside the control of the principal (other than student body composition) that impact school effectiveness, such as the support of neighborhood organizations. One way to account for the elements of school effectiveness that are outside of principals' control is to compare the effectiveness of the school during the principal's tenure with the effectiveness of the school at other times. The measure of a principal's effectiveness would then be how effective the school is at increasing student learning while the principal is in charge in comparison to how effective the school is (or was) at other times when another person holds the principal position. Conceptually, this approach is appealing if we believe the quality of the school that a principal inherits affects the quality of that school during the principal's tenure, as it most likely does.

There are, however, practical reasons for concern with within-school comparisons, namely, that the comparison sets that can be tiny and, as a result, idiosyncratic. This approach holds more appeal when data are available over a long enough period of time for the school to experience many

principals. However, if there is little principal turnover or the data stream is short, this approach may not be feasible or advisable. Schools with only one principal during the period of observation will have no variation with which to differentiate the principal effect from the school effect, regardless of how well or poorly the principal performs.<sup>2</sup> Schools with two or three principals for each school over the duration of the data will allow a principal effect to be differentiated, but we may worry about the accuracy of the resulting principal effects estimates as measures of principal performance. Because each principal's estimate is in relation to the other principals who have served in that school in the data, how well the *others* performed at the principal job can impact a given principal's estimated effect on the school. Consider the simplest case where only two principals are observed, and assume Principal A is exactly in the middle of the distribution of actual principal performance. If Principal B is a poor performer, under the relative school effectiveness approach, Principal A will look good by comparison. If B is an excellent performer, A will look poorer. Principals A and B may have also served at the school for different lengths of time, which makes directly comparing them with one other difficult. A related shortcoming of Approach 2 is that it cannot control for changes over time in district policy or other external events (e.g., implementation of new teacher evaluation systems or Common Core) that may influence how principals do their jobs and how they perform relative to previous or future principals at their school.

The sorting of principals across schools exacerbates the potential problem with this approach. Principals are not sorted randomly across schools. Schools serving many low-income, non-White, and low-achieving students have principals who have less experience and less education and who attended less selective colleges (Loeb, Kalogrides, & Hornig, 2010). If principals are distributed systematically across schools such that more effective principals are consistently in some schools but not in others, then the comparison of a given principal to other principals who lead the same school is not a fair comparison. This dilemma is similar to the one faced in estimating teacher effects. If teachers are distributed evenly across schools, then comparing a teacher

with other teachers in their school is a fair comparison and eliminates the potential additional effect of school factors outside of the classroom. However, if teachers are not distributed evenly across schools, then this within-school comparison disadvantages teachers in schools with better colleagues. Similarly, the estimated effect of the second-best principal in the district might be negative under this approach if she simply had the bad luck of being hired into the spot formerly held by the first-best principal, even if she would have had (potentially large) positive estimated effects in nearly every other school.

### *Approach 3: School Improvement*

So far we have considered models built on the assumption that principal performance is reflected immediately in student outcomes and that this reflection is constant over time. Perhaps more realistic, however, is an expectation that new principals take time to affect their schools and their effect builds over their tenure in the school. A good principal may improve the school by building a productive work environment (e.g., through hiring, professional development, and building relationships), which may take several years to achieve. If so, we may wish to employ a principal effects model that accounts for this time dimension.

One such alternative measure of principal effectiveness would capture the *improvement* in school effectiveness during the principal's tenure. That is, the school may have been relatively ineffective in the year prior to the principal starting, but if the school improves over the duration of the principal's tenure, then that improvement would be a measure of his or her effectiveness. Similarly, if the school's performance declines as the principal's tenure in the school extends, the measure would capture that as well.

The appeal of such an approach is its clear face validity. However, it has disadvantages. In particular, the data requirements are substantial. There is measurement error in any measure of student learning gains, and differencing these imperfectly measured variables to create a principal effectiveness measure increases the error (Boyd et al., 2013; Kane & Staiger, 2002). There simply may not be enough signal in average student achievement gains at the school level to get

acceptably reliable measures of improvement. That is, this measure of principal effectiveness may be so imprecise as to provide little evidence of actual effectiveness. In addition, this approach faces the same challenges of the second approach in that if the school was already improving because of work done by prior administrators, we may overestimate the performance of principals who simply maintain this improvement. Similarly, if the school was doing well but had a bad year just before the transition to the new principal then by measuring improvement relative to this low starting point, the approach might not accurately capture the principal's effectiveness.<sup>3</sup>

These three approaches—school effectiveness, relative school effectiveness, and school improvement—provide conceptually different measures of principal effectiveness. Each is based on a conceptually different model of principals' effects, and the implementation of each model will lead to different concerns about bias (validity) and precision (reliability). The goals of the analyses below are to create measures based on these conceptual approaches, compare them with one another, and compare them with other, non-test-based measures of principal performance.

## Data

The data used in this study come from administrative files on all staff, students, and schools in the Miami-Dade County Public Schools (M-DCPS) district from the 2003–2004 through the 2010–2011 school years. M-DCPS is the largest public school district in Florida and the fourth largest in the United States. In 2010, M-DCPS enrolled 347,000 students, more than 225,000 of whom were Hispanic. Nearly 90% of students in the district are either Black or Hispanic, and 60% qualify for free or reduced priced lunches. Our analysis makes use of data from 523 principals with 719 principal-by-school observations (see Table 1).

We use measures of principal effectiveness based on the achievement gains in math and reading of students at a school. The test score data include math and reading scores from the Florida Comprehensive Assessment Test (FCAT). The FCAT is given in math and reading to students in Grades 3 to 10.<sup>4</sup> The FCAT includes

criterion-referenced tests measuring selected benchmarks from the Sunshine State Standards. We standardize students' test scores to have a mean of zero and a standard deviation of one within each grade and school year.

We combine the test score data with demographic information, including student race, gender, free or reduced price lunch eligibility, and whether students are limited English proficient. We can link students to their schools and thus to their principals in each year. M-DCPS staff information includes demographic measures, prior experience in the district, highest degree earned, and current position and school for all staff members.

In addition to creating measures of principals' value-added and contrasting these measures, we also compare the value-added measures with several non-test-based performance measures. Table 1 provides descriptive statistics for these measures. First, we compare the measures with the school accountability grades. Florida grades each school on a 5-point scale (A, B, C, D, and F) that is meant to succinctly capture performance. Grades are based on a scoring system that assigns points to schools for their percentages of students achieving the highest levels in reading, math, science, and writing on Florida's standardized tests in Grades 3 through 10, or who make achievement gains. Grades also factor in the percentage of eligible students who are tested and the test gains of the lowest performing students.

M-DCPS leadership also evaluates principals each year, and we obtained these evaluation outcomes from the district for the 2001 through 2010 school years. In each year, there are four distinct evaluation ratings in the data provided to us, though the labels attached to these ratings varied across years. The highest rating is either *distinguished* or *substantially exceeds standards* (47% of principal-by-year observations); the second highest rating is *exceeds standards* or *commendable* (45%); the third highest rating is *competent*, *meets standards*, or *acceptable*; and the lowest rating is *below expectations*, with fewer than 10% receiving one of the two lowest ratings. We code the ratings on an ordinal scale from 1 to 4 and take their average for all years that a principal is employed at a given school.<sup>5</sup>

We also compare the value-added measures with student, parent, and school staff assessment



TABLE 1  
*Descriptive Statistics*

	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>	<i>n</i>	Year measured
Number of principal–school combinations			719	
Number of principals			523	
Gender: Female	0.67		719	Constant
Gender: Male	0.33		719	Constant
Race/ethnicity: White	0.23		717	Constant
Race/ethnicity: Black	0.35		717	Constant
Race/ethnicity: Hispanic	0.41		717	Constant
Race/ethnicity: Other	0.01		717	Constant
Average standardized math score, first tested grade	−0.06	0.39	687	First year at school
Average standardized reading score, first tested grade	−0.06	0.40	683	First year at school
Proportion White	0.08	0.10	719	First year at school
Proportion Black	0.36	0.34	719	First year at school
Proportion Hispanic	0.54	0.31	719	First year at school
Proportion absent 21 or more days	0.10	0.10	719	First year at school
Proportion suspended	0.08	0.11	719	First year at school
AP rating of principal (overall)	−0.04	0.91	167	2008 survey
AP rating of principal (management)	−0.03	0.97	216	2008 survey
AP rating of principal (operations)	−0.01	0.91	211	2008 survey
AP rating of principal (instruction)	−0.02	0.90	189	2008 survey
AP rating of principal (internal relations)	−0.04	0.92	228	2008 survey
AP rating of principal (external relations)	−0.05	0.97	220	2008 survey
Principal rating of own effectiveness (overall)	0.00	0.99	203	2008 survey
Principal rating of own effectiveness (management)	0.00	0.99	236	2008 survey
Principal rating of own effectiveness (operations)	0.01	1.00	232	2008 survey
Principal rating of own effectiveness (instruction)	−0.02	1.01	221	2008 survey
Principal rating of own effectiveness (internal relations)	−0.02	1.01	233	2008 survey
Principal rating of own effectiveness (external relations)	−0.02	1.00	237	2008 survey
Teacher retention rate (in school)	0.82	0.08	678	Average while at school
Student chronic absence rate	0.10	0.10	719	Average while at school
School climate scale–student report	−0.14	1.00	703	Average while at school
School climate scale–staff report	−0.16	1.05	712	Average while at school
School climate scale–parent report	−0.19	1.05	706	Average while at school
School accountability grade, 0- to 4-point scale	2.81	1.20	690	Average while at school
Average of ratings received from district (1–4)	3.54	0.51	658	Average while at school
Proportion of years received highest rating from district	0.59	0.41	658	Average while at school

*Note.* The data include one observation for each principal–school combination except in cases where 2008 survey items are used—these just use principal–school combinations in 2008. AP = assistant principal.

of the school climate from the district-administered climate survey. These surveys ask a sample of students, teachers, and parents from each school in the district to agree or disagree with following three statements: (a) Students are safe at this school, (b) students are getting a good education at this school, and (c) the overall climate at

this school is positive and helps students learn at this school. A fourth item asks respondents to assign a letter grade (A–F) to their school that captures its overall performance. The district provided these data to us from the 2004 through the 2009 school years. They had collapsed the data to the school-year level so that our measures capture

the proportion of parents, teachers or students that agree with a given statement as well as the average of the grades respondents would assign to their school. We create three scales based on student, teacher, and parent responses that combine these four items. We take the first principal component of the four measures in each year and then standardize the resulting factor scores for students, teachers, and parents.<sup>6</sup>

Next, we compare the measure with principals' and assistant principals' assessments of the principals that we obtained from an online survey we administered in regular M-DCPS public schools in spring 2008. Nearly 90% of surveyed administrators responded. As described in Grissom and Loeb (2011), both principals and assistant principals were asked about principal performance on a list of 42 areas of job tasks common to most principal positions (e.g., maintaining a safe school environment, observing classroom instruction). We use factor scores of these items to create self-ratings and assistant principal ratings of aggregate principal performance over the full range of tasks, as well as two more targeted measures that capture the principal's effectiveness at instruction and at organizational management tasks, such as budgeting and hiring. We chose these specific task sets because of evidence from prior work that they are predictive of school effectiveness (Grissom & Loeb, 2011; Horng, Klasik, & Loeb, 2010).

Our final comparisons are between the principal value-added measures and two indirect measures of school health: the teacher retention rate and the student chronic absence rate. The retention rate is calculated as the proportion of teachers in the school in year  $t$  who returned to that same school in year  $t + 1$ . The student chronic absence rate is the proportion of students absent more than 20 days in a school in a given year, which is the definition of chronic absence used in Florida's annual school indicators reports.

### Model Estimation

Following the discussion above, we estimate three types of value-added measures based on different conceptions about how principals affect student performance: school effectiveness during a principal's tenure, relative within-school effectiveness, and school improvement.

This section describes the operationalization of each approach.

#### *Approach 1: School Effectiveness*

We estimate two measures of school effectiveness during a principal's tenure. Equation 1a describes the simplest of the models where the achievement,  $A$ , of student  $i$  in school  $s$  with principal  $p$  in time  $t$  is a function of that student's prior achievement, student characteristics,  $X$ , school characteristics,  $S$ , class characteristics,  $C$ , year and grade fixed effects, and a principal-by-school fixed effect,  $\delta$ , the estimate of which becomes our first value-added measure.<sup>7</sup>

$$A_{ispt} = A_{is(t-1)}\beta_1 + X_{ispt}\beta_2 + S_{spt}\beta_3 + C_{spt}\beta_4 + \tau_y + \gamma_g + \delta_{sp} + \varepsilon_{ispt}. \quad (1a)$$

This model attributes to the principal the additional test performance that a student has relative to what we would predict given the prior year test score and the background characteristics of the student and his or her peers. In other words, this model defines principal effectiveness to be the average covariate-adjusted test score growth for all students in that principal's school over the time the principal works there. This approach is similar to models typically used to measure teacher value-added, which measure teacher effectiveness as the average growth of the teachers' students in the years they teach them. One drawback of using this approach for principals is that the principal might have affected both prior years' performance and the current performance if the principal was in the same school the year before, a limitation that teacher models are assumed not to face (as fourth-grade teachers cannot directly affect third graders' learning, for example). However, this approach does still capture whether the learning gain during the year is greater than would be predicted given other factors in the model.<sup>8</sup>

A second model capturing school effectiveness during a principal's tenure is summarized by Equation 1b. It is similar to the approach above except that, instead of comparing students to observationally similar students, it compares the learning of a given student with his or her own learning when in a school headed by a different principal. Here the change in student achievement from  $t - 1$  to  $t$  is modeled as a function of the student's time-varying characteristics, the

school characteristics, class characteristics, a student fixed effect ( $\pi_i$ ), and student-level random error.<sup>9</sup> The principal-by-school fixed effect,  $\delta$ , is again the effectiveness measure.

$$A_{ispt} - A_{ispt(-1)} = X_{ispt}\beta_2 + S_{spt}\beta_3 + C_{spt}\beta_4 + \pi_i + \tau_y + \delta_{sp} + \varepsilon_{ispt}. \quad (1b)$$

Model 1b differs from Model 1a primarily by including a student fixed effect, which adjusts for unobservable characteristics of students. However, student fixed effects models have the disadvantage of relying only on students who switch schools or have multiple principals to identify the effects. Although we use a data stream long enough to observe both many students switching across school levels (i.e., structural moves) and many students switching schools within school levels, this requirement may reduce both the generalizability of the results and reliability of the estimates.<sup>10</sup>

After estimating the fixed effects models, we save the principal-by-school fixed effect coefficients and their corresponding standard errors. The estimated coefficients for these fixed effects include both real differences in achievement gains associated with teachers or schools and measurement error. We therefore shrink the estimates using the empirical Bayes method to bring imprecise estimates closer to the mean (see Online Appendix 1, available at <http://epa.sagepub.com/supplemental>), though shrinking the school fixed effects tends not to change the estimates much given the large student samples in each school.

Note that typical estimation of fixed effects models sets one group as equal to zero, making the interpretation of the remaining fixed effects to be deviations from the omitted category. This solution is not a valid one for our application, however, because we do not want the estimated fixed effects to be contingent on which principal we omit. Therefore, we require that the fixed effects sum to zero, as described in Mihaly, McCaffrey, Lockwood, and Sass (2010). Under this restriction, the principal effects are interpreted as deviations from the average principal.

### *Approach 2: Relative Within-School Effectiveness*

As with Approach 1, we create two measures of relative principal effectiveness, comparing a

principal with other principals in the same school. Equation 2a describes our first value-added measure for this approach.

$$A_{ispt} = A_{is(t-1)}\beta_1 + X_{ispt}\beta_2 + S_{spt}\beta_3 + C_{spt}\beta_4 + \tau_y + \gamma_g + \varphi_s + \delta_p + \varepsilon_{ispt}. \quad (2a)$$

Like Equation 1a, Equation 2a models a student's test score as a function of last year's score, student characteristics ( $X$ ), (time-varying) school characteristics ( $S$ ), and classroom characteristics ( $C$ ). Model 2a also includes a principal fixed effect ( $\delta$ ) and a school fixed effect ( $\varphi$ ), which nets out the average of students in the school during the full-time period.

The interpretation of the fixed effects becomes more complicated in a model with both school and principal fixed effects. Principals and schools form many disconnected groups because not every principal works at every school. While the most direct comparisons are made among principals who have served in the same schools, comparisons can also be made among principals who have served in the same connected network of schools, where a network is defined as the set of schools in which every school has had at least one principal transfer to at least one other school in the network during the analysis period. When we include school fixed effects, one principal effect in each group is not identified. Therefore, when the model includes both principal and school fixed effects, we require that the principal effects sum to zero within each network of connected principals. The principal effects in this case are interpreted as deviations from the group mean. The principal value-added measures are thus based on the principal fixed effects and shrunk (within networks) to adjust for measurement error as described above. By only comparing principals who serve in a connected network of schools, the specification in Equation 2a reduces the amount of school effectiveness that we attribute to the principal. Approach 1 above attributes all of the school's growth during a principal's tenure to that principal, while Equation 2a only attributes the *difference* between the learning of students during the principal's tenure and the learning of students in the same network at other times.

There are trade-offs to this approach. We can only estimate these models for principals who work at schools that have more than one

principal during the time span of the data, which limits the analytic sample. Even when the models are estimable, we might be concerned that a comparison with just one or two other principals who served at the school cannot be justified. This issue may be present even in lengthy data streams; in our models, comparison groups average only three principals per network (i.e., each principal can be compared to two others).

Another potential downside of the principal effects from Equation 2a is that estimating a separate fixed effect for each school and principal places substantial demands on the data because it is nonparametric. It estimates a separate value for each school's effect. As an alternative, we run a series of models that do not include the school fixed effect but include controls for the average value-added of the school during the years before the principal was leading the school. Equation 2b describes this approach.

$$A_{ispt} = A_{is(t-1)}\beta_1 + X_{ispt}\beta_2 + S_{spt}\beta_3 + C_{spt}\beta_4 + \beta_5 E_s + \tau_y + \gamma_g + \delta_p + \varepsilon_{ispt}. \quad (2b)$$

$E$  is the effectiveness of school  $s$  in the years prior to the principal's tenure.  $E$  is estimated using a model similar to Equation 1a, substituting a school-by-year fixed effect for a principal-by-year fixed effect, then averaging the value of the (shrunk) school effect for school  $s$  in the years prior to the start of principal  $p$ 's tenure.<sup>11</sup> Principals who are the first or only principal to serve at a given school during our data stream are dropped from this model as we do not have a measure of prior school value-added for these principals. Similarly, given the inclusion of the principal fixed effect, principals must serve at two or more schools for which we were able to estimate prior value-added to be included in the model. This restriction limits the sample to about 35% of all principal-by-school combinations. Despite this shortcoming, the merit of this model is that it maintains some of the intuitive appeal of the relative school effectiveness approach without the losses due to small network sizes inherent in Model 2a.<sup>12</sup>

### Approach 3: School Improvement

Our third approach defines principal effectiveness as school improvement during a principal's

tenure. Equation 3 describes our value-added measure capturing this improvement.

$$A_{ispt} = A_{is(t-1)}\beta_1 + X_{ispt}\beta_2 + S_{spt}\beta_3 + C_{spt}\beta_4 + \gamma_g + \delta_{sp} + \alpha_{sp}T_{spt} + \varepsilon_{ispt}. \quad (3)$$


The model is similar to the one described in Equation 1a except that it includes a measure of the time that the principal has been the principal of the school (entered as a linear time trend  $T$ ) and a principal-specific coefficient on that time trend, as well as a principal-by-school fixed effect,  $\delta$ . This approach allows a separate starting point (intercept) for each principal and then allows the school to improve under the principal's leadership. In this case, our measure of principal value-added is the time-trend coefficient,  $\alpha$ ; we shrink this estimate as described above.

Importantly, we restrict these models to principals working in a school at least 3 years so that estimating a time trend in performance is meaningful. Because the administrative files do not contain a measure of school-specific experience, we must further restrict these models to principals that we observe in their first year at a school, which reduces the sample substantially. Still, we prefer this approach to using all principal-school combinations because the effects of a principal on school improvement may be very different in their initial years than it is after they have been at the school for a longer period of time.

### The Distribution of Principal Effects

In total, we run five main models that capture five distinct measures of principal effectiveness. Figure 1 plots the distributions of each of the measures for math and reading value-added. The distributions are approximately normal for all the measures. Shrinking the estimates narrows each distribution relatively little, as we would expect given the large number of student observations used to derive each estimate. Still, there are patterns. Shrinkage affects the estimates of Model 1b, which includes student fixed effects, more than Model 1a. This observation is not surprising given that student fixed effects use substantially more degrees of freedom. For Approach 2, the principal effects are narrowed more by shrinkage in the estimates that include school fixed effects (Equation 2a) than in the models that include controls for

# MATH



# READING




FIGURE 1. *The distribution of value-added principal effectiveness measures.*  
Note. EB = empirical Bayes.



prior school effectiveness. These differences are again not surprising considering Model 2a includes school fixed effects while Model 2b does not. Approach 3, which defines principal effectiveness by school improvement, begins with a narrow distribution and narrows further by shrinkage. This narrowing is expected given that measuring change exacerbates measurement error.

It is also important to note that each approach includes a different sample of schools due to the different constraints of the models. Approach 1 includes about 70% of schools, and Approaches 2 and 3 include 40% to 50% of schools. In some specifications, schools that are excluded tend to be slightly lower achieving compared with schools that are included. However, these differences are small and not consistent across models. Excluded schools do not differ appreciably in terms of other characteristics of their student bodies, which is reassuring.

Table 2 provides the standard deviations of the estimates of principal effects from our models as well as the values of our estimates at various percentiles. These standard deviations are a measure of how much principals vary in their effect on student achievement. We report the standard deviation of the coefficients from the models from which we get the estimates and the standard deviation of the shrunken coefficients that we use as our effectiveness measures. The shrunken estimates are the best approximation of each principal's effect, but the variance of these shrunken estimates is an underestimation of the variance in the true principal effect. This difference arises because each principal effect has more error—requiring greater shrinkage—than do groups of principals, the basis of the variance calculations. Because of this difference, we also report a third variance, which is simply the variance of the fixed effects minus the mean of the squared standard errors. We label this term the *true* standard deviation.

Looking across these effectiveness estimates, we first observe that they are generally in the range of estimates obtained in other studies using different data and specifications. Dhuey and Smith (2012), for example, estimate standard deviations of 0.09 to 0.16 in units of standard deviations of student performance, while Branch et al. (2012) estimate these at approximately 0.11, and Chiang et al. (2012) estimate them at

0.05 to 0.09. Yet we also see that the variance in the effect differs substantially by estimation approach. The measures based on the school effectiveness models show the largest effect estimates. Model 1a has a standard deviation of 0.11 for math and 0.08 for reading, compared with 0.19 and 0.14 for the student fixed effects model. While shrinking narrows these distributions, the change is relatively small.

Our second approach conceptualizes principal effectiveness as value-added relative to the value-added of the school when other principals are in charge. Here the standard deviations are, not surprisingly, far smaller because we are removing the variation in value-added across schools. The two models produce similar estimates of the standard deviation of the empirical Bayes shrunken estimates, 0.06 and 0.07 for math and 0.04 and 0.06 for reading. The standard errors of the coefficients are much larger for the approach that includes school fixed effects in the model. This inclusion increases the noise in the estimates, and the resulting standard deviations are higher for the unshrunk coefficients in the model with school fixed effects than in the model with controls for the school's estimated value-added.

The final approach estimates principal effectiveness as the increase in school effectiveness during the principal's tenure and is labeled as Model 3. The standard deviation of the shrunken estimates are smaller in these models than in the models based on the other two approaches, with standard deviations of 0.03 for math and 0.02 for reading. These estimates are lower than the ones reported in other studies, as one might expect given that *improvement* in student learning is conceptually different from the *level* of student learning, the basis of prior estimates of principal value-added.

Differences in the standard deviations of the estimates across models could be driven by differences in the modeling approach or differences in the sample used to estimate the models. Approaches 2 and 3 have considerably smaller samples than Approach 1. We thus include in Table 2 the standard deviations of the estimates for Approach 1 but for the restricted sample included in the estimation of Approach 2 or 3. For the most part, the differences in the samples do not lead to large differences in our calculations of the standard deviations of the value-added

TABLE 2  
*Distribution of Principal Value-Added Estimates*

	Standard deviations			Percentiles of estimates before EB shrinkage					<i>n</i>
	FE	EB	TRUE	10th	25th	50th	75th	90th	
<b>Math</b>									
Approach 1: School effectiveness									
Model 1A (no student FE)	0.109	0.095	0.105	-0.121	-0.072	-0.002	0.071	0.134	781
Model 1B (with student FE)	0.190	0.141	0.175	-0.183	-0.099	-0.023	0.068	0.183	781
Model 1A (no student FE)—Restricted to Model 2A sample	0.112	0.096	0.107	-0.129	-0.078	-0.006	0.065	0.131	484
Model 1B (no student FE)—Restricted to Model 2A sample	0.201	0.140	0.188	-0.192	-0.105	-0.031	0.056	0.171	484
Model 1A (no student FE)—Restricted to Model 2B sample	0.112	0.095	0.107	-0.120	-0.069	0.005	0.082	0.151	353
Model 1B (no student FE)—Restricted to Model 2B sample	0.228	0.148	0.215	-0.179	-0.107	-0.021	0.085	0.243	353
Model 1A (no student FE)—Restricted to Model 3 sample	0.097	0.090	0.094	-0.107	-0.067	0.004	0.069	0.134	263
Model 1B (no student FE)—Restricted to Model 3 sample	0.149	0.130	0.140	-0.145	-0.091	-0.011	0.073	0.180	263
Approach 2: Relative within-school effectiveness									
Model 2A (principal and school FE)	0.064	0.058	0.059	-0.062	-0.024	0.002	0.027	0.058	484
Model 2B (principal FE, control for prior school effectiveness)	0.084	0.070	0.080	-0.115	-0.064	-0.016	0.032	0.085	353
Approach 3: School improvement									
Model 3 (principal-by-school time trend)	0.058	0.032	0.050	-0.063	-0.033	-0.005	0.023	0.056	263
<b>Reading</b>									
Approach 1: School effectiveness									
Model 1A (no student FE)	0.083	0.069	0.077	-0.099	-0.055	-0.002	0.050	0.104	794
Model 1B (with student FE)	0.141	0.095	0.118	-0.140	-0.084	-0.022	0.047	0.141	795
Model 1A (no student FE)—Restricted to Model 2A sample	0.084	0.069	0.077	-0.097	-0.052	-0.005	0.048	0.104	488
Model 1B (no student FE)—Restricted to Model 2A sample	0.148	0.095	0.122	-0.145	-0.089	-0.020	0.048	0.159	488
Model 1A (no student FE)—Restricted to Model 2B sample	0.082	0.067	0.075	-0.103	-0.062	-0.011	0.040	0.096	366
Model 1B (no student FE)—Restricted to Model 2B sample	0.166	0.099	0.146	-0.145	-0.089	-0.016	0.068	0.236	366
Model 1A (no student FE)—Restricted to Model 3 sample	0.078	0.069	0.074	-0.098	-0.041	-0.001	0.052	0.093	226
Model 1B (no student FE)—Restricted to Model 3 sample	0.121	0.088	0.108	-0.108	-0.061	-0.003	0.066	0.155	226
Approach 2: Relative within-school effectiveness									
Model 2A (principal and school FE)	0.038	0.039	0.034	-0.045	-0.019	0.001	0.023	0.047	488
Model 2B (principal FE, control for prior school effectiveness)	0.065	0.055	0.061	-0.086	-0.040	-0.005	0.032	0.079	366
Approach 3: School improvement									
Model 3 (principal-by-school time trend)	0.042	0.023	0.032	-0.116	-0.087	-0.070	-0.049	-0.028	226

*Note.* FE refers to the original fixed effects estimates while EB refers to the empirical Bayes shrunken estimates. TRUE calculates the standard deviation by taking the square root of the variance of the fixed effects minus the mean of the standard errors squared.

estimates. Thus, the differences in the standard deviations across approaches seem to be due to differences in the models rather than to differences in the samples.

These analyses have the value-added measures scaled in the units of student achievement. We see that the standard deviation of the estimates vary across the different approaches: The value-added measures that attribute all school effects to the principal have the greatest variance and the models that estimate gains in school effectiveness have the smallest variance. For the remainder of the article, we standardize each of the measures to have a mean of 0.0 and a standard deviation of 1.0. We make this conversion so that we can compare among principals using a standard metric, that is, a standard deviation in the value-added estimate.

In addition to having different distributions (i.e., different variance), the different value-added measures have different coverage. We can measure value-added under the first approach for more principals. Models 1a and b have sample sizes of 781 principal-by-school observations. Approach 2 includes controls for the school during the time that other principals were in charge and thus it is limited to schools with at least two principals. Model 2a includes school fixed effects and thus other principals have to be in the school for at least 1 year during the sample period. Model 2b is more restrictive because it includes a control for school value-added in years *prior* to the current principal's arrival. To be included in Model 2a, the principal just had to work at a school that was led by another principal at any time (before or after their tenure) in our data period, but to be included in Model 2b, a principal must have a predecessor at the same school within the period covered by the data. Approach 3 (school improvement) requires the most years of data and thus reduces the sample substantially to approximately 263 principal by school observations. The sample sizes make clear that the data requirements differ across models and affect the feasibility of estimating the different approaches in practice.

### Comparing Results Across Models

The value-added models are conceptually different, but are they also empirically different? Table 3 provides the correlations among the

shrunk, standardized measures. The first relationship to note is that Models 1a and 2b are fairly highly correlated. The difference between the two specifications is that Model 2b includes a control for the value-added of school during other principals' leadership. This inclusion changes the estimates, but they are still correlated at .58 for math and .63 for reading. The high correlation between Models 1a and 2b could be due to substantial measurement error in the control for prior principal effectiveness as described above. The correlations between the approach that uses principal-by-school time trends and the other two approaches are quite small and not statistically significant.

In Approach 3, we treat the principal-by-school time trend as our measure of value-added. In Table 3, we also show the correlation between the intercept from Model 3 and the principal-specific time trends. The intercept can be interpreted as the school's effectiveness in the year before the principal arrived (i.e., when time = 0), and the principal-by-school time trends are annual deviations from that intercept. Not surprisingly, we find a negative correlation between the main effect and the principal-specific time trends, suggesting that principals who take over in schools that are higher performing also see less rapid improvement in their students' test score gains during their tenure at a school. This correlation highlights a potential drawback of using school improvement as a measure of principal effectiveness.<sup>13</sup>

An alternative to assessing correlations among the models' predictions is to check the consistency of the prediction for a given principal when his or her effect estimate is calculated using one model versus another. For each model, we sort the predictions into quartiles, then, for any two modeling Approaches A and B, we check how often the highest performers under Model A (i.e., the highest quartile) would be reassigned to the lowest quartile if Approach B was used instead. Results of this exercise are shown in Table 4. For simplicity, only math comparisons are shown (reading results are similar). The table illustrates that reclassification rates between the two extreme quartiles tell a similar story to the correlation table. Model 1a and Model 2b, which differ by the inclusion of controls for school value-added, have relatively low reclassification.

TABLE 3  
*Pairwise Correlations Among Alternative Principal Effect Estimates*

	1A <sup>a</sup>	1B	2A	2B	3-intercept	3-slope
<b>Math</b>						
Model 1B: School effectiveness (with student FE)	<b>.54</b>	1.00				
Model 2A: Relative within-school effectiveness (principal and school FE)	<b>.45</b>	<b>.37</b>	1.00			
Model 2B: Relative within-school effectiveness (principal FE, control for prior school effectiveness)	<b>.58</b>	<b>.50</b>	<b>.60</b>	1.00		
Model 3: Intercept from model with principal by school time trend	<b>.34</b>	<b>.60</b>	.13	<b>.36</b>	1.00	
Model 3: Principal by school time trend	-.05	-.09	<b>.16</b>	.09	<b>-.53</b>	1.00
<b>Reading</b>						
Model 1B: School effectiveness (with student FE)	<b>.37</b>	1.00				
Model 2A: Relative within-school effectiveness (principal and school FE)	<b>.39</b>	<b>.31</b>	1.00			
Model 2B: Relative within-school effectiveness (principal FE, control for prior school effectiveness)	<b>.63</b>	<b>.26</b>	<b>.44</b>	1.00		
Model 3: Intercept from model with principal by school time trend	<b>.48</b>	<b>.35</b>	<b>.27</b>	.52	1.00	
Model 3: Principal by school time trend	-.01	-.16	-.04	.14	<b>-.37</b>	1.00

Note. Bolded correlations are significant at  $p \leq .05$ . The sample sizes differ for each set of correlations due to missing data. The *ns* range from 226 to 781. See Table 2 for the sample sizes for each measure. FE = fixed effect.

<sup>a</sup>Model 1A is School effectiveness without student FE.

TABLE 4  
*Reclassification Rates (Math, Selected Models): Percent Appearing in Quartile 4 of Row Approach That Appear in Quartile 1 for Column Approach*

	Model 1A	Model 1B	Model 2A	Model 2B	Model 3
Model 1A: School effectiveness (no student FE)	—				
Model 1B: School effectiveness (with student FE)	5.1	—			
Model 2A: Relative within-school effectiveness (principal and school FE)	9.1	11.4	—		
Model 2B: Relative within-school effectiveness (principal FE, control for prior school effectiveness)	6.2	11.3	11	—	
Model 3: Principal-by-school time trend	29	26	24	30	—

Note. FE = fixed effect.

However, Model 2a, which includes school fixed effects, has a high reclassification rate with all the other models. These reclassification rates show that choice of model matters substantially for how principal performance would be rated under different estimation systems; for example,

26% to 29% of the highest performers under the simplest model (Approach 1) would be reclassified as among the lowest performers under the school improvement model (Approach 3).

We can also compare estimates within the models by comparing results for math and reading

TABLE 5

*Correlation Between Math and Reading Principal Value-Added Estimates*

	Between math and reading	Across schools	
		Math	Reading
Model 1A: School effectiveness (no student FE)	<b>.51</b>	<b>.25</b>	<b>.16</b>
Model 1B: School effectiveness (with student FE)	<b>.56</b>	<b>.16</b>	<b>.16</b>
Model 2A: Relative within-school effectiveness (principal and school FE)	<b>.61</b>	NA	NA
Model 2B: Relative within-school effectiveness (principal FE, control for prior school effectiveness)	<b>.53</b>	NA	NA
Model 3: Principal-by-school time trend	<b>.44</b>	-.39	-.11

*Note.* The first column reports the correlation between value-added in math and reading for each principal–school combination. The second and third columns report the correlations between a given value-added estimate for a given principal in the first and second schools that he or she serves. Bolded correlations are significant at  $p < .05$ . FE = fixed effect.

and, for a subset of principals, comparing their value-added in one school with their value-added when serving in a different school. Table 5 gives these results. The correlations between math and reading value-added are statistically significant, ranging from .44 for the school improvement Model 3 to .61 for Model 2a. The correlations are generally lowest for Approach 3. Note that Approach 1 is perhaps most subject to inflation from sorting of principals among schools of similar performance levels, while Approach 3 is perhaps most subject to measurement error due to its use of differences in student achievement growth.

The correlations between math and reading show some consistency, but the results comparing the same principal serving in different schools are more sobering. Using the same approaches, we compare the value-added of each principal when he or she leads one school with the value-added estimated when he or she leads another school. We only report these estimates for the first and third approaches because the second approach does not distinguish when principals are at different schools. The across-schools correlations are positive and significant for the first approach, ranging from .16 to .25, but they are not statistically significant and are actually negative in sign for the third approach. The higher correlation for Approach 1 could result from the approach better capturing true principal effectiveness that is portable across sites. However, it also could come from the sorting of principals: Some principals tend to work in schools that

have a baseline of greater effectiveness, and the correlation simply captures this sorting and not the principal effect. There is no evidence that the improvement that Approach 3 measures is at all portable across schools.

### Correlations With Nontest Measures

Given the differences across the value-added measures of principal effectiveness, the next set of analyses compares these measures with nontest-based measures of principal and school effectiveness. We cannot tell from this analysis which approach is correct, per se; “correctness” is largely a question of how principals actually affect schools, as discussed previously. However, we can learn what measures of value-added these other measures most closely reflect.

While the test-based measures adjust for differences across principals in the characteristics of the schools in which they work, the other measures do not. Because of this lack of adjustment, we estimate the relationships between the value-added estimates and the alternative measures using a regression approach in which we adjust for the school average of lagged test scores in the first tested grade, percent White students, percent Black students, percent of students suspended, and percent of students chronically absent.<sup>14</sup> All of these variables are measured during the first year in which we observe a principal at a school. We also adjust for principal race and gender, in the event that these factors may influence some



TABLE 6

*Comparing Principal Value-Added Measures in Math to External Evaluation Measures*

	School accountability grade	Average of evaluation ratings	School climate: Student report	School climate: Staff report	School climate: Parent report	AP rating of principals' task effectiveness	Principal rating of their task effectiveness
School effectiveness (no student FE)							
Model 1A	0.326*** (0.024)	0.111*** (0.024)	0.156*** (0.024)	0.168*** (0.034)	0.122*** (0.029)	0.194 <sup>†</sup> (0.102)	0.179 <sup>†</sup> (0.096)
<i>n</i>	733	637	742	745	743	191	204
School effectiveness (with student FE)							
Model 1B	0.192*** (0.025)	0.061** (0.022)	0.128*** (0.023)	0.153*** (0.028)	0.125*** (0.026)	0.168 <sup>†</sup> (0.090)	0.097 (0.107)
<i>n</i>	733	637	742	745	743	191	204
Relative within-school effectiveness (principal and school FE)							
Model 2A	0.146*** (0.026)	0.076* (0.035)	0.028 (0.023)	0.100** (0.033)	0.021 (0.028)	-0.136 (0.624)	0.126 (0.567)
<i>n</i>	454	390	460	463	461	103	108
Relative within-school effectiveness (principal FE, control for prior school effectiveness)							
Model 2B	0.299*** (0.032)	0.133*** (0.038)	0.139*** (0.029)	0.156*** (0.047)	0.133*** (0.037)	0.186 (0.120)	0.124 (0.139)
<i>n</i>	331	253	338	340	339	76	76
Principal-by-school time trend							
Model 3	-0.010 (0.033)	-0.010 (0.032)	-0.012 (0.027)	-0.021 (0.050)	-0.030 (0.036)	-0.033 (0.079)	-0.131 (0.153)
<i>n</i>	244	246	251	251	251	101	99

*Note.* The values in parentheses refer to standard errors. The models include one observation for each principal-by-school combination. The models include controls for principal race and gender, average lagged school test score among students in the youngest tested grade, percent White, percent suspended, and percent chronically absent at the school. The school-level measures are taken from the first year that a principal was observed at the school. The models also include fixed effects for the networks used to generate the principal value-added estimates. Results for reading value-added and other external measures are available in Online Appendix 2 at <http://epa.sagepub.com/supplemental>. AP = assistant principal; FE = fixed effect.

<sup>†</sup> $p \leq .10$ . \* $p \leq .05$ . \*\* $p \leq .01$ . \*\*\* $p \leq .001$ .

of the nontest outcomes such as subjective performance evaluations.<sup>15</sup> For most of the non-test-based measures of principal effectiveness, we do not know the reliability. As a result, measurement error concerns dictate that we model the alternative measures as a function of the test-based measures (which we can adjust for measurement error due to sampling error) and the controls. These models also include fixed effects for principal networks because each principal's value-added estimates are relative to their network averages. Table 6 shows the relationship between select nontest items and math value-added. The results for reading value-added, which are very similar, and additional nontest

items are shown in Online Appendix 2, available at <http://epa.sagepub.com/supplemental>.

The first comparison is between the value-added measures and both the average state accountability grade given to the school during the principal's tenure and the district's evaluation of the principal.<sup>16</sup> The first clear result is the absence of positive relationships between outcomes and the value-added estimates based on the third approach. If these Approach 3 estimates are, in fact, picking up school improvement (and not just noise), there is no evidence that either the school accountability grade or the principal evaluation score is measuring school improvement. All of the other estimates—those for Approaches

1 and 2—are positively correlated with the outcomes. The strongest relationship is clearly with the simplest model from the first approach. Both the accountability grade and the district evaluation of the principal are more closely linked with average school effectiveness during the principal's tenure than to the effectiveness of the principal relative to other principals who have served at the school or, certainly, to school improvement.

Students, staff, and parents evaluate the school through yearly school climate surveys. The next three columns of Table 6 compare the value-added measures with student, parent, and staff reports of the school climate. The story here is very similar to the one for accountability grades and district principal evaluations. The outcome measures are most strongly related to the school effectiveness estimates of principal value-added as captured by Approaches 1 and 2b. The two specifications within the first approach do an about equal job of explaining the variation in the climate measures. The two measures in Approach 2 generally have positive point estimates in the regression but are only consistently significant for Approach 2b. Again, there is no evidence at all that Approach 3 is related to the student, staff, or parent assessments of the climate.

Our next set of comparisons is between the value-added measures and assistant principals' and principals' assessment of principals' task effectiveness. Note that these models are only estimated for principals in 2008, the year of our survey. In both cases, the simplest model in Approach 1 is most closely associated with assistant principal and principal evaluations. In this case, the second estimation of Approach 2, which includes the control for school effectiveness instead of the school fixed effect, is also positive but only about half as large as the simplest approach. The estimates from Approach 3 are, again, unrelated to the outcome measures. The estimates from Approach 2 that control for a school fixed effect similarly explain none of the variation in the evaluations. Again, the evaluation measures appear to be picking up school effectiveness as measured by how much students learn in comparison with observationally similar students in other schools.

Finally, in results shown in Online Appendix 2, available at <http://epa.sagepub.com/supplemental>, we compare the value-added measures with other

outcome measures for the school: teacher retention and student chronic absenteeism. We see little relationship between teacher retention and principal value-added. There are, however, some significant relationships for student chronic absenteeism, particularly for the simplest value-added measures. The second model in the first approach is somewhat more highly correlated than the first. Principals who lead schools in which students learn more than they do when they are in other schools are also in schools with lower chronic absenteeism, though these relationships are only apparent for Approach 1 estimates.

In summary, the comparisons with other ratings indicate that the simplest models, those measuring school effectiveness during the principal's tenure, are most strongly related to the non-test-based measures. The within-school comparison approach is sometimes positively related to other measures, but these results are not at all consistent. The final approach, measuring improvement, shows no positive relationship with any of the other measures.

## Discussion and Conclusion

Both the rhetoric and the laws addressing the evaluation of school principals often advocate for the use of student test scores to judge principal effectiveness. This position has a clear logic: Principals should be assessed in accordance with how they affect the outcomes that we care about. Education researchers similarly have become interested in using student test scores to study principal performance. Yet work on both the policy and research fronts is proceeding without close attention to the properties of potential test-based measures of principals' effects. This study, which presents different theoretical and empirical approaches to measuring principal effectiveness, compares them with one other, correlates them with non-test-based measures, and suggests that close attention to these issues is indeed necessary.

We present three different approaches to measuring principals' influence on student performance. The first simply measures the effectiveness of the school during a principal's tenure, attributing all school effects to the principal, even though he or she is unlikely to be in control of many

elements contributing to school performance, such as neighborhood influences that may be only partially controlled for by student background characteristics. This approach also fails to account for principals inheriting their schools, including most of their staff, from prior school leaders. In the M-DCPS sample, only 23% of teachers and 33% of assistant principals come in new to a school with a new principal, and even for many of these new hires, the new principal likely played no role in their selection given the timing of principal hires and moves. For these reasons and others, this first approach likely over-attributes school effectiveness to the principal.

The second approach compares the effectiveness of the school under one principal with the effectiveness of the same school under other principals. It has the advantage of not attributing all of the school effect to the principal and can take into account neighborhood effects and some other factors outside the principal's control. It makes the assumption that school effects due to unmeasured characteristics are constant over time, which may be more palatable than the assumption implicit in the first model that effects due to unmeasured characteristics are constant across schools. From a theoretical perspective, however, this assumption is clearly imperfect as it ignores that schools are not static in the difficulties and opportunities they present to principals. There are other drawbacks as well. For example, if highly effective principals systematically sort to certain schools, then the within-school comparison will miss important variation. On a practical level, data requirements are stringent. Because the measures rely on comparisons of principals serving at the same school, they can only be calculated for principals who serve at a school for which there is data on multiple principals. In addition, by comparing principals only with other principals who have served in the same school, this approach leads to very small comparison groups and, as a result, an individual principal's evaluation could then be strongly affected by the idiosyncrasies of this comparison set.

These first two approaches measure the average school effectiveness during a principal's tenure (either overall or in comparison with other principals at the same school); the third approach

measures the improvement in school effectiveness during that time. This approach has the theoretical appeal of capturing improvement. It is unlikely that a principal's full effect is felt immediately, and an improvement model conceptually captures incremental effects. Again, however, the data requirements for this approach are high. A principal has to serve in a school for multiple years to use this approach. More importantly, measures of improvement are measures of changes, and changes are difficult to capture reliably. Our analyses provide evidence that these improvement measures are so noisy that they may not be useful in practice.

If the measures that resulted from these different approaches were highly correlated with each other, then the choice of measures would not be important. However, they are not strongly correlated. This issue is especially stark for the school improvement approach, which is rarely correlated with the other approaches at all, but it is apparent for the other approaches as well. Even *within* the same conceptual approach, the choice of model matters; comparing a simple school effectiveness model with and without a student fixed effect (i.e., Approaches 1a and 1b) produces a correlation of only .54 for math and .37 for reading. This pattern of low correlations is driven in part by problems internal to each of the measures. Although the principals who have higher value-added by one measure in math often have higher value-added on that same measure in reading, the estimate of a principal's effectiveness while leading one school is not strongly predictive of how effective he or she will be in another school even employing the same calculation.

To better understand these measures, we compared them with a variety of other school outcome measures. These comparisons show that the first approach—measuring the effectiveness of the school during the principal's tenure—is more predictive of the non-test-based measures than the other two approaches. In fact, the third approach that measures improvement is potentially *negatively* correlated with these other measures.

The implications of these results may not be as clear as they first seem. The non-test-based measures appear to validate the value-added measure of principal effectiveness that is based

on the school effectiveness, a measure that has unappealing conceptual properties (see also Chiang et al., 2012). An alternative interpretation, however, is that these positive relationships represent a shortcoming in the nontest measures. In rating the performance of the principal, district officials, for example, likely take into account the effectiveness of the school itself. Asked to assess principals' leadership skills, assistant principals and the principals themselves may be partially basing their ratings on how well the school is performing instead of purely on the principal's effectiveness itself. In other words, differentiating the performance of the principal from that of other school factors may be a difficulty confronted by both test-based and subjective evaluations.

In sum, there are important trade-offs among the different modeling approaches. The simplest approach seemingly over-attributes aspects of the school's performance to the principal, but it produces estimates that correlate relatively highly across math and reading, across different schools in which the principal works, and with other measures of nontest outcomes we care about. However, the relative within-school effectiveness and school improvement approaches come closer to modeling a reasonable relationship between principal performance and student outcomes conceptually, but perhaps because the data requirements are stringent, empirically the results inspire less confidence. Moreover, their data needs (either multiple principals in a school or multiple years for a single principal in a school) mean that they cannot be calculated for many principals.

These conceptual and empirical trade-offs and their attendant cautions apply both to researchers seeking to use value-added measures to characterize principal job performance and to state and district policymakers considering how test-score-based measures might be used for principal evaluation and accountability. For policymakers, the challenges are especially difficult. Evaluation systems created by Florida's Student Success Act and similar policies require a test-score-based measure of principal performance for each principal in each year. An empirical model that cannot be estimated for some principals or in some years of their tenure may thus be impractical. Similarly, policymakers may prefer—and state

laws may require—year-by-year measures of principal effectiveness, which are not the same as *average* effectiveness over multiple years of data estimated by these models. Although some of these modeling approaches (e.g., Approach 1a or 2b) could be adapted to the year-by-year case—and indeed systems in Florida and elsewhere have done essentially just that—not only would the same conceptual challenges apply but also the resulting estimates are likely to be less reliable than the ones we have presented. Policymakers must also consider principals' potential responses to incentives created by a particular model, which may go beyond the intended incentive to increase student performance. For example, models based on the school effectiveness approach that do not fully account for influences on school performance outside the principal's control may have the unintended consequence of further exacerbating the relative attractiveness of leadership positions in high-performing and low-performing schools, making it harder to attract the best principals to the schools that could benefit from them most. Investigating and comparing the conceptual and empirical properties of existing state or district systems for evaluating principals and the effects of those systems on principal behavior would make fruitful avenues for future research.

The inconsistencies and drawbacks of the measures lead to consideration of whether policymakers should use them at all. Theoretically, if student test performance is an outcome school systems value, then scores should be used in some way for assessing schools and holding personnel accountable. The warning that comes from these analyses is that it is important to think carefully about what the measures are revealing about each principal's contribution and to use the measures for what they are, which is *not* as a clear indicator of principals' specific impact on student test score growth.

The focus of this article has been on the accuracy and fairness of the value-added measures. We have not addressed their effectiveness as tool for improvement. Evaluating principals based on measures of value-added to student test performance may result in improved student outcomes, even if the evaluations are poor measures of a principal's efficacy. Using student test scores as a metric draws attention to these measures and

highlights the importance that the district (or other governing body) places on these measures and, perhaps, on student learning more generally. If the value-added measures are clearly unfair, then a system that rewards them without an understanding of their multiple causes may be counterproductive, but one that uses them to highlight the value of student learning while balancing them with other measures and understanding of their shortcomings may have positive effects even if the measures are imprecise or biased.

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### **Notes**

1. Even if this approach was conceptually satisfactory, disentangling teacher and principal effects is not possible empirically in a given year because teacher and principal effects are collinear.

2. For example, in our data, 38% of schools are served by only one principal. Thirty percent of schools are served by two principals and 33% are served by three or more. About two thirds of principals serve at only one school during our data stream while the remaining one third serve at two or more schools. The average number of years that we observe principals at each school is about 3 years and the average annual

turnover rate is between 30% and 35%.

3. This approach focuses on the cumulative effect of a principal over time. It does not, however, account for delayed effects of principal quality. For example, policies that were enacted by a principal could take a few years to have any measurable effect on student learning. Those delayed effects could be attributed to the wrong principal if the principal that enacted those policies leaves before they have any impact. While in this article we only consider immediate versus cumulative principal effects, modeling delayed principal impacts should be considered in future research.

4. It is also given in writing and science to a subset of grades. We use only math and reading scores for this study.

5. The evaluations are based on a rubric that covers eight areas of principal practice: vision, strategic and ethical decision making, accountability and assessment, knowledge management and innovation, managing the environment, human resources, interpersonal relationships, and community and stakeholder partnerships. The principal receives a rating on each dimension and the ratings are aggregated to produce a summative score.

6. In all cases, the weights on the four elements of each factor are approximately equal and the eigenvalues are all 3.4. We choose to use a composite scale of the items because the individual items are highly correlated with one another. For example, the correlations among the staff reports for the four items range from .75 to .91.

7. We estimate models separately for math and reading. Because we use a lagged test score to construct our dependent variables or as a control variable on the right-hand side in some specifications, the youngest tested grade (Grade 3) and the first year of data we have (2003) are omitted from the analyses, though their information is used to compute a learning gain in Grade 4 and in 2004. Student characteristics used in our analyses are gender, race, and ethnicity indicators, whether the student qualifies for free or reduced priced lunch, whether the student is classified as limited English proficient, whether they are repeating the grade in which they are currently enrolled, and the number of days they missed school in a given year due to absence or suspension (lagged). Variables included in *C* and *S* are all of the student-level variables averaged at the classroom and school levels, respectively.

8. Some research shows that principal departures are correlated with temporary declines in student performance (Betteille, Kalogrides, & Loeb, 2011; Miller, 2013). Approach 1a attributes any temporary declines to poor performance of the new principals. We experimented with alternative models where we omit the



first and last year a principal serves as a school from the estimation. We find that these alternative specifications result in value-added estimates that are correlated at .90 with the estimates obtained from Approach 1a.

9. Covariates in Model 1b are identical to Model 1a, except that time-invariant characteristics in  $X$  are dropped.

10. Experimental research by Kane and Staiger (2008) suggests that student fixed effects estimates may be more problematic than similar models using a limited number of student covariates.

11. Note that, by shrinking our estimate of  $E$ , we are adjusting for sampling error to reduce potential measurement error bias in the estimation of Equation 2b. However, to the extent that  $E$  includes error beyond this sampling error—for example, a “shock” that affected the whole school—this estimation will also be prone to measurement error bias. For this reason, Equation 2b likely is preferred in terms of reduction in error of measurement, while Equation 2a is preferable in terms of bias, though Equation 2b might reduce the error of measurement.

12. In an additional approach not shown here, we estimate a model that controls for the growth trajectory of the school. We model student achievement as a function of the regular student and classroom variables, a school-by-principal effect and a school-specific time trend. This model is similar to Model 1a but with the addition of a time trend for the school. This model accounts for the school’s growth trajectory before the principal came on board. We omit this measure from the manuscript for brevity, but note that it correlated with the Approach 1 estimates at between .30 and .35 and with the Approach 2 estimates at between .14 and .16. We also ran an alternative specification of Equation 2b which includes a student fixed effect and models the gains in achievement but includes the same independent variables as in Equation 1b. The results are similar to those without the student fixed effect, though attenuated. Results are available from the authors upon request.

13. It is worth noting that measurement error in the estimates of principal value-added leads to an underestimation of the true correlations. While it is possible to adjust for the error to get estimates of the correlations in the underlying measures, we have chosen to show the correlations among the estimates for individual principals without additional adjustment. We do so because if the value-added measures were used in practice, the only choice would be to use the measures themselves. The correlations tell us how similar they are and thus the unadjusted correlation is more relevant for this article. While measurement error reduces the correlation, the fact that the value-added measures are based

on many of the same students may lead to an artificially inflated estimate of correlations. Again, because we are interested in the extent to which the different models give different results, we are less concerned with this inflation for the purpose of this study. However, there are other situations for which it would be informative to see correlations based on different students (both for the same models and for different models).

14. The test score control measure is the mean prior year test score of the first tested grade at a school. This means fifth grade for middle schools (which start at sixth grade) and eighth grade for high schools (which start at ninth grade). For elementary schools, we still use third grade as no lags are available for them.

15. Whether or not we include controls for race and gender has little influence over the estimates included in Table 6.

16. For all of these analyses, we ran an alternative specification in which that forced the sample sizes to be the same across value-added measures. While for most studies we would present those findings instead, in this case the sample differences are an inherent part of the approach. In practice, restricting the sample changed the results very little and the alternative tables are available from the authors upon request.

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